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Enslavement in the Twentieth Century:





The onrush of statutory and decisional law speaking to the
joint issue of juvenile emancipation and constitutional rights is
a matter of common knowledge.' The resulting enlargement of
the canopy protecting the personal rights and privileges of
* B.A. New York University, 1936; L.L.B., New York University School of
Law, 1938; L.L.M., University of Southern California School of Law, 1963; Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney, 1961-1967; Adjunct Professor of Law, Pepperdine University
School of Law, 1970-1971; Adjunct Professor of Law, Northrop University
School of Law, 1975-1978; Court Commissioner, Superior Court County of Los
Angeles, California, 1967 to date.
** Student, Pepperdine University School of Law, Class of 1978.
1. Recent cases of special note on the subject include: Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension from school without notice or hearing denies student
due process of law); In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 655, 566 P.2d 997,139 Cal. Rptr. 861
(1977) (minor child fourteen years of age or older has a right to a hearing before
his parents may have him put into a state mental hospital); Planned Parenthood
of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1975) (right of a minor to have an abortion during
the first trimester of pregnancy); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 97 S. Ct. 2010
(1977) (right of children under sixteen years of age to purchase contraceptives);
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1968) (students in school as
well as out of school are "persons" under the constitution).
minors now incorporates most of those guarantees associated
with the area of criminal law.2 However, even though juvenile
rights have expanded tremendously in certain areas of the law,
two glaring statutory "Achilles heels" remain in the California
Civil Code which deserve immediate legislative and judicial
attention.3 In short, while the child proceeds to obtain the same
constitutional rights and guarantees as an adult, the minor re-
mains an economic slave to his or her parents under current
California law.
Historically the touchstones of the indenturing of children in
California are three-fold. First, the wording of Sections 197 and
5118 of the California Civil Code, speaking of the parent's enti-
tlement to the child's earnings; second, the restricted applicabil-
ity of section 36.1 of the California Civil Code, granting the
superior court jurisdiction only where the minor's contract is
submitted to the court for approval;4 and third, the surprising
2. E.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (waiver hearing of
juvenile court jurisdiction must measure up to the essentials of due process and
fair treatment); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966) (juvenile court adjudication of
delinquency must comport with the requirements of due process; child has right
to appointed counsel where he cannot afford one; constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination is applicable to juvenile proceedings; absent a valid
confession, a juvenile must be afforded the rights of confrontation and sworn
testimony of witnesses available for cross-examination); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt as required by the due process
clause is necessary when a child is charged with an act that would constitute a
crime if committed by an adult); In re Michael M., 11 Cal. App. 3d 741, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 718 (1970) (plea of guilty in a juvenile proceeding may not be accepted
unless the defendant affirmatively waives his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and confrontation on the record); In re M.G.S., 267 Cal. App. 2d 329, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 808 (1968) (due process of law is a requisite to the constitutional validity of
juvenile court proceedings); People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365,432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 586 (1967) (minor's age does not render him incapable of waiving his
rights); People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976)
(juvenile may not be held by the Youth Authority for a term exceeding that
which might be imposed upon an adult misdemeanant committing the same
offense); In re Ricky H., 2 Cal. 3d 513,468 P.2d 204, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1970) (waiver
of counsel in fear of parental reprisal invalid); In re Dana J. v. Superior Court, 4
Cal. 836, 484 P.2d 595, 94 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1971) (minor entitled to a free transcript
of trial for use on appeal if he personally is unable to afford counsel without
regard to his parents' financial status); In re Jean M., 16 Cal. App. 3d 96, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 679 (1971) (sufficiency of evidence for determination that a minor had
knowingly been about a place in which narcotics were unlawfully used).
3. These are sections 197 and 5118 of the California Civil Code. For text,
see notes 8-9, infra, and accompanying text.
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 36.1 (West 1954) provides:
In any order made by the superior court approving a contract of a minor
for the purposes mentioned in section 36 of this code, the court shall
have power, notwithstanding the provisions of any other statutes, to
require the setting aside and preservation for the benefit of the minor,
either in a trust fund or in such other savings plan as the court shall
approve, of such portion of the net earnings of the minor, not exceeding
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lack of ability to enforce the law.' Furthermore, the struggle for
economic emancipation of the minor child has become more
difficult as a result of California courts' continued reliance up-
on a distinction between "wages" and "property" of the child.
Before addressing a remedy, this article shall examine the
problem in more detail and propose that the legislative and
judicial intention to allow minor children to retain their own
earnings already exists. In the process, the inadequacy of the
present statutory solutions, the inviability of a distinction be-
tween "wages" and "property" of a child and the need for great-
er protection of children's earnings will be presented.
THE PROBLEM
Civil Code Sections 197 and 5118
At common law, the services and earnings of a minor child
belonged absolutely to the child's father while the child lived
with and was supported by him.6 This common law parental
prerogative was early accepted in the United States as part of
the traditional law of England. With Sections 197 and 5118 of the
Civil Code, California stands with virtually every other juris-
diction in the United States in holding that the parent having
legal custody and control of his or her unemancipated minor
child has a right to the child's services and earnings.7
one-half thereof, as the court may deem just and proper, and the court
may withold approval of such contract until the parent or parents or
guardian, as the case may be, shall execute and file with the court his or
their written consent to the making of such order. For the purposes of
this section the net earnings of the minor shall be deemed to be the total
sum received for the services of the minor pursuant to such contract less
the following: All sums required by law to be paid as taxes to any
government or governmental agency; reasonable sums expended for
the support, care, maintenance, education and training of the minor;
fees and expenses paid in connection with procuring such contract or
maintaining the employment of the minor; and the fees of attorneys for
services rendered in connection with the contract and other business of
the minor.
Pragmatically, all contracts with minors must be submitted for the superior
court's approval if protection from the minor's power to disaffirm the contract
pursuant to Civil Code § 35 is to be obtained.
5. The California Codes prescribe no penalties for failure to obey the court
order setting aside a portion of the minor's earnings in trust.
6. See J. MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS § 120, at 403-07 (1931).
7. The following states endorse the general rule that the father, parent, or
guardian having legal control and custody of an unemancipated minor child has
Section 197 of the Civil Code provides:
The mother of an unmarried minor child is entitled to its custody,
services and earnings. The father of the child, if presumed to be the
father under subdivision (a) of Section 7004, is equally entitled to the
custody, services and earnings of the unmarried minor. If either the
father or mother be dead or unable or refuse to take the custody or has
abandoned his or her family, the other is entitled to its custody, serv-
ices and earnings.
8
Civil Code Section 5118 provides: "The earnings and accumu-
lations of a spouse and the minor children living with, or in the
custody of, the spouse, while separate and apart from the other
spouse, are the separate property of the spouse."9
a right to the child's services and earnings: Williams v Williams, 202 Ala. 539, 1
So. 41 (1919); L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alas. 1976); Pickthall v. Steinfeld, 12
Ariz. 230, 100 P. 779 (1909); Lopez v. Waldrum Estate, 249 Ark. 558, 460 S.W.2d 61
(1970); Burge v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 608,262 P.2d 6 (1953);
McEntyre v. Jones, 128 Colo. 461, 263 P.2d 313 (1953); Kenure v. Brained &
Armstrong Co., 88 Conn. 265, 91 A. 185 (1914); Kosciuszko Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v.
Konzan, 50 A.2d 786 (Del. 1947); Hunt v. Calacino, 114 F. Supp. 254 (D.C. Cir.
1953); Covey v. Eppes, 153 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1963); Rhodes v. State, 76 Ga. App. 667,
47 S.E.2d 293 (1948); Tuckey v. Lovell, 8 Idaho 731, 71 P. 122 (1902); Ekendahl v.
Svolos, 388 Ill. 412, 58 N.E.2d 585 (1945); Siebeking v. Ford, 128 Ind. App. 475,148
N.E.2d 194 (1958); Vaupel v. Bellach, 261 Iowa 376, 154 N.W.2d 149 (1967); Ping
Mining & Mill Co. v. Grant, 68 Kan. 732, 75 P. 1044 (1904); Cashen v. Riney, 239
Ky. 779, 40 S.W.2d 339 (1931); Lewis v. Southern Advance Bag & Paper Co., 147
So. 532 (La. 1933); Fuller v. Blair, 104 Me. 469, 72 A. 182 (1908); Lucas v. Maryland
Drydock Co., 182 Md. 54, 31 A.2d 637 (1943); Detore v. Demers Bros., 312 Mass.
531, 45 N.E.2d 745 (1943); Fox v. Schumann, 191 Mich. 331, 158 N.W. 168 (1916);
Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400,37 N.W.2d 543 (1949); Gulf Refining Co. v. Miller,
153 Miss. 741, 121 So. 482 (1929); Gilman v. C.W. Dart Hardware Co., 42 Mont. 96,
111 P. 550 (1910); Mitchell v. Mosher, 362 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. 1962); Spomer v. Allied
Elec. & Fixture Co., 120 Neb. 399, 232 N.W. 767 (1930); Warren v. Delong, 57 Nev.
131, 59 P.2d 1165 (1936); Lessard v. Great Falls Woolen Co., 83 N.H. 576, 145 A. 782
(1929); Caforo v. Caforo, 14 N.J. Misc. 331, 184 A. 779 (1936); Cole v. Jaeger, 80
N.Y.S.2d 92 (1947), aff'd, 78 N.Y.S.2d 381, 273 App. Div. 911 (1948), appeal and
rearg: denied, 79 N.Y.S.2d 519, 273 App. Div. 1008 (1948); Goodyear v. Goodyear,
257 N.C. 374, 126 S.E.2d 113 (1962); 14 N.D. CENT. CODE § 09-18 (1971); Bluebird
Baking Co. v. McCarthy, 36 N.E.2d 801 (Ohio 1935); Sweet v. Crane, 39 Okla. 248,
134 P. 1112 (1913); Potter v. Davidson, 143 Ore. 101, 20 P.2d 409 (1933); Gaydos v.
Domobyl, 301 Pa. 523, 152 A. 549 (1930); Lottinville v. Dwyer, 68 R.I. 263, 27 A.2d
305 (1942); Lide v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Mid., 191 S.C. 297, 4 S.E.2d 263 (1939);
Hodkinson v. Parker, 70 S.D. 272, 16 N.W.2d 924 (1944); Smith v. Smith, 220
S.W.2d 627 (Tenn. 1949); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ballew, 66 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.
1933); Chase v. Smith, 5 Vt. 556 (1833); Weade v. Weade, 153 Va. 540, 150 S.E. 238
(1929); American Prod. Co. v. Villwock, 7 Wash. 2d 246,109 P.2d 570 (1941); Cook
v. Virginian Ry Co., 97 W. Va. 420, 125 S.E. 106 (1924); Patek v. Plankinton
Packing Co., 179 Wisc. 442, 190 N.W. 920 (1922); Kreigh v. Cogswell, 45 Wyo. 531,
21 P.2d 831 (1933).
Three jurisdictions appear to recognize that at a minimum, the earnings of a
minor do not absolutely belong to the parent: Hahuna v. Unna, 6 Hawaii 485
(1884); Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 190 (1857); Kuchenmeister v. Los Angeles &
S.L.R. Co., 52 Utah 116, 172 P. 725 (1918).
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 197 (West Supp. 1977).
9. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1978). Prior to its amendment in 1971,
§ 5118 stated that: "the earnings and accumulations of the wife, and of her minor
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On their face, these code sections deprive the unmarried
minor child absolutely of any right to remuneration such child
may receive in return for the child's labor, in favor of vesting
such right in the child's parent or parents. The parents retain
the right to the child's earnings irrespective of the child's
wishes. The child has no right to control the use of the funds, nor
does the child acquire any interest in property purchased in
part or in whole with his or her earnings.
Generally the basis for the rule entitling the parents to the
child's earnings has been predicated on the reciprocal obliga-
tion of the parents to support the child. In discussing the
father's right to a child's earnings, Justice Finch in Wardrobe v.
Miller10 cited that rationale as controlling authority, stating:
The right to a child's services and earnings is reciprocal to the duty to
support .... It is certainly perfect while the period of the child's
nurture continues. But if this is all, it can be of little consequence,
because the child's labor and services are for that period of little
value; nor could compensation be thus afforded for the many years
when the child was entirely helpless .... His right to their [his
children's] services, like his right to their custody, rests upon the
parental duty of maintenance, and it is said to furnish some compen-
sation to him for his own services rendered to the child. 1
Thus, where the parent has no legal duty to support the
child, 12 the parent can claim no interest in the earnings of the
child.1 3
Judicial Interpretation of Sections 197 and 5118
The philosophy underlying Sections 197 and 5118 of the Civil
Code provided the basis for the California courts to disallow the
minor's interest in a series of early cases.
children living with her or in her custody, while she is living separate from her
husband, are the separate property of the wife." In its present form, § 5118
entitles whichever spouse who has custody of a minor child to that child's
earnings.
10. 53 Cal. App. 370, 200 P. 77 (1921). See notes 24-25, infra, and accompany-
ing text.
11. Id. at 375, 200 P. at 79.
12. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 3 (1976) (apart from contractual agreement stepfather has no legal duty to
support minor stepdaughter).
13. See, e.g., Santos v. Santos, 32 Cal. App. 2d 62, 89 P.2d 164 (1939) (man
living with a woman under belief that they were actually married when in fact
they were not legally married could not claim right to share of services and
earnings of minor children of the woman).
In Macchi v. LaRocca14 the child was an intervenor in a suit
commenced to obtain equal division of certain property ac-
quired by the minor's natural father and a woman in the course
of an unlawful marriage. The father admitted in his answer to
the complaint that his minor child had earned approximately
$5,600.00 during the period of cohabitation of the parties, and
that the greater portion thereof was used by the father in the
purchase of the property. The court found, however, that the
father was entitled to use the child's earnings as he saw fit, and
whether they were used to meet the household expenses or in
the purchase of property was no concern of the child. "In the
absence of an express agreement ... the minor son acquired no
interest in the property purchased in part with his earnings and
no trust resulted in his favor.'
15
It might appear that the Macchi decision recognized the possi-
bility, at least, of a minor acquiring some interest in property
purchased with his earnings, if the prerequisite of an express
agreement can be shown to the satisfaction of the court. As
evidenced by the following cases, however, the practical dif-
ficulties of proving such an express agreement between parents
and children make the possibility suggested in Macchi, of a
minor acquiring an interest in his earnings, a virtual impossibil-
ity where the minor remains at home.
In Smith v. Smith,16 the plaintiff, who was the son of the
defendants, brought an action to recover a sum of money, al-
leged to have been turned over by him in small amounts during
his minority and for a period of time thereafter to the defend-
ants. He alleged that the wages and salary earned by him had
been given to the defendants pursuant to an agreement, wherein
the defendants had agreed to keep and invest the wages, salary,
and income, preserving them until they should be returned to
the plaintiff on demand. In finding that no such agreement
existed, the court stated:
It does not necessarily follow from the mere fact that a party has
delivered money or property of any kind to another that the latter has
agreed to return the same to the former. Indeed, in the absence of any
showing to the contrary, the presumption is that money paid by one to
another was due the latter, and that a thing delivered by one to
another belonged to the latter.1
7
14. 54 Cal. App. 98, 201 P. 143 (1921).
15. Id. at 100-01, 201 P. at 144.
16. 38 Cal. App. 388, 176 P. 382 (1918).
17. Id. at 392, 176 P. at 383. The Smith court also reaffirmed by implication
the traditional rule that minor children do not have the unilateral privilege to
emancipate themselves without the express or implied consent of their parents.
Id. See note 48, infra, and accompanying text.
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This "gratuitous service" rule was again applied in Ruble v.
Richardson.18 Plaintiff brought an action against the executor
of the estate of her aunt for breach of an alleged contract to
render services. The contract, alleged by the plaintiff, was an
agreement wherein plaintiff would remain in the household of
the aunt and act as a daughter and perform the duties of a
daughter until the aunt should die. In return, the aunt was to
amply provide for and adequately compensate her niece in her
will. In rejecting evidence of express and implied promises of
compensation, the court stated the rule as follows:
Ordinarily, where services are rendered and voluntarily accepted, the
law will imply a promise upon the part of the recipient to pay for
them; but where services are rendered by members of a family, living
in one household, to each other, or necessaries are supplied by one
near relation to another, the law will presume that they were gratuit-
ous favors merely, prompted by friendship, kindness and the relation-
ship between them. And in such case, before the person rendering the
service can recover, the express promise of the party served must be
shown or such facts and circumstances as will authorize the jury to
find that the services were rendered in the expectation of one of
receiving, and by the other of making compensation therefor. 19
In Wood v. James,20 a similar claim was brought by the plain-
tiff against the estate of her mother to recover under an agree-
ment to compensate her for services provided as a nurse. Al-
though recognizing the general rule that a child who is living
with his parent is not entitled to compensation for services ren-
dered to his parent,21 the court allowed the plaintiff to recover
after finding that she had been called away from her own home
in another country to nurse her mother, thus eliminating "the
suspicion with which the courts sometimes look at claims of
children against estate of deceased persons . ."22
From the foregoing it can be seen that despite the suggestion
in Macchi, supra, that children need only present evidence of an
express agreement to obtain an interest in their earnings, unless
the minor child can overcome the "suspicion with which the
courts sometimes look at claims of children, ' 23 he or she will not
18. 188 Cal. 150, 204 P. 572 (1922).
19. Id. at 157, 204 P. at 575.
20. 15 Cal. App. 253, 114 P. 587 (1911).
21. Id. at 259, 114 P. at 575.
22. Id.
23. Id.
recover. The parental right to the child's earnings creates a
strong presumption against such an agreement. This presump-
tion was overcome in James only because the daughter could
present independent witness testimony regarding the mother's
agreement to pay for her daughter's services and the daughter's
residence apart from her mother's house.
At times, the parent entitled to the custody and control of his
or her children can exercise the right to receive the children's
earnings or to recover their wages even when the children have
left the parent's home. In Wardrobe v. Miller,24 for example, the
natural father was allowed to recover the reasonable value of
his minor sons' services provided to their stepfather after the
children had gone to live with their mother following an argu-
ment with their father.2
THE INADEQUATE STATUTORY SOLUTIONS TO THE. PROBLEM
In view of the absolute right of the parents to their children's
earnings, the parents were, at common law, the proper persons
to make a contract covering their children's services. However,
practical difficulties arose with such a contract. First, since the
child was not a necessary party to the contract, other means
were required to induce the child to conform to its terms. Sec-
ond, such a contract could not be specifically enforced. Third,
the contract expired when majority was reached. Finally, even
where the minor had executed his own contract, it was subject
to the usual disabilities of any contract by a minor.26
In 1927, in an effort to meet these practical difficulties, espe-
cially with respect to motion picture contracts, section 36 of the
Civil Code was enacted to provide a proceeding whereby the
minor's contract could be made binding on the child.27 The
24. 53 Cal. App. 370, 200 P.77 (1921).
25. Id. at 375, 200 P. at 80. The opinion of the court, written by Presiding
Justice Finch, emphasized both the fact that the natural father had not waived
his right to the earnings of his sons and also the fact that the minor sons were not
received into the stepfather's family as permanent members thereof, but rather
were merely allowed to reside with them temporarily pursuant to an express
agreement to that effect. The principles accepted as having a direct application
to the case would have allowed the natural father to recover even if the chil-
dren's work had been done against his express consent or even in the event that
the stepfather had requested the father to take his children away and he had
neglected to do so.
26. See Howell, The Work of the 1939 California Legislature, 13 S. CAL. L.
Rv. 1, 44 (1939).
27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 36 (West Supp. 1977) provides:
(a) A contract, otherwise valid, entered into during minority, cannot be
disaffirmed upon that ground either during the actual minority of the
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statute did not, however, depose the parents of their rights to the
earnings under such a contract. Children remained the econom-
ic servants of their parents under such contracts until 1938,
when, due largely to the controversy over the earnings of Jackie
Coogan, the well-known child actor, Sections 36.128 and 36.229 of
the Civil Code were added, giving the court approving a
contract under section 36 the power to set aside up to one-half
person entering into such contract, or at any time thereafter, in the
following cases: •(1) A contract to pay the reasonable value of things necessary for his
support, or that of his family, entered into by him when not under the
care of a parent or guardian able to provide for him or them; provided,
that these things have been actually furnished to him or to his family.(2)(i) A contract or agreement pursuant to which such person is em-
ployed or agrees to render artistic or creative services, or agrees to
purchase, or otherwise secure, sell, lease, license or otherwise dispose of
iterary, musical or dramatic properties (either tangible or intangible) or
any rights therein for use in motion prictures, television, the production
of phonograph records, the legitimate or living stage, or otherwise in the
entertainment field, where such contract or agreement has been ap-
proved by the superior court in the county in which such minor resides
or is employed or, if the minor neither resides in or is employed in this
state, where any party to the contract or agreement has its principal
office in this state for the transaction of business.(ii) As used in this paragraph, "artistic or creative services" shall
include, but not be limited to, services as an actor, actress, dancer,
musician, comedian, singer, or other performer or entertainer, or as a
writer, director, producer, production executive, choreographer,
composer, conductor or designer.(3) A contract or agreement pursuant to which such person is em-
ployed or agrees to render services as a participant or player in profes-
sional sports, including, without being limited to, professional jockeys,
where such contract or agreement has been approved by the superior
court in the county in which such minor resides or is employed or, if the
minor neither resides in or is employed in this state, where any party to
the contract or agreement has its principal office in this state for the
transaction of business.(b) The approval of the superior court referred to in paragraphs (2)
and (3) of subdivision (a) may be given upon the petition of either party
to the contract or agreement after such reasonable notice to the other
party thereto as may be fixed by said court, with opportunity to such
other party to appear and be heard; and its approval when given shall
extend to the whole of said contract or agreement, and all of the terms
and provisions thereof, including, but without being limited to, any
optional or conditional provisions contained therein for extension, pro-
longation or termination of the term thereof.
28. See note 4, supra, for text.
29. CAL. CIV. CODE § 36.2 (West 1954) provides:
The superior court shall have continuing jurisdiction over any trust or
other savings plan established pursuant to section 36.1 and shall have
power at any time, upon good cause shown: to order that any such trust
or other savings plan shall be amended or terminated, notwithstanding
the provisions of any declaration of trust or other savings plan. Such
order shall be made only after such reasonable notice to the beneficiary
and to the parent or parents or guardian, if any, as may be fixed by the
court, with opportunity to all such parties to appear and be heard.
the minor's earnings in a trust fund or other savings plan for the
benefit of the child.
While children receive a legally protected interest in their
earnings under these statutes, the laws are not of universal
application. By their terms, sections 36.1 and 36.2 apply only to
contracts by the minor itself where the contract is submitted to
the superior court for approval under Section 36 of the Civil
Code. Hence, where parents contract for their children's serv-
ices themselves, or where a contract executed by the children is
not submitted to the superior court under section 36, absolute
parental power over the children's earnings remains. While
movie producers, corporate studios, or professional sports team
owners may, in seeking economic security, habitually insist that
their contracts with minors be submitted to the superior court
for approval to prevent the minor's disaffirmance, these
contracts concern only a small portion of working children. As
one commentator suggested in an early analysis of the laws:
[I]t would seem that a readjustment of the whole question of parental
right to all the earnings of a minor child is in order. The concept of
property right in the services and earnings of the minor child was
never intended for the modern situations of child workers of excep-
tional ability. Indeed it is at least a question whether in regard to any
children it is in accord with contemporary ideas.
30
Even after the adoption of Sections 36.1 and 36.2 of the Civil
Code, that portion of children's wages not set aside by the court
for their benefit remains subject to unilateral appropriation by
their parents.
THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL OBJECTIVE: PARENTAL SUPPORT
OF THE CHILD INDEPENDENT OF THE CHILD'S ESTATE
California statutes make it clear that the parents are responsi-
ble for support of the child without any reference to the child's
earnings. Section 196 of the Civil Code provides in part that
"[tlhe parent entitled to the custody of a child must give him
support and education suitable to his circumstances. '" 31 No-
where does it appear that the parents have discretion to use the
children's earnings to support their children. Section 196(a) of
the Civil Code states in part that "[t]he father as well as the
mother of a child must give him support and education suitable
to his circumstances. A civil suit to enforce such obligations
may be maintained in behalf of a minor .... ,,32 Again, there is
30. Note, Recent California Legislation in the Law of Persons, Industrial
Relations, and Social Welfare, 28 CAL. L. REV. 450 (1940).
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (West Supp. 1977).
32. CAL. CiV. CODE § 196(a) (West Supp. 1977).
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no discretion to resort to the child's earnings. In fact, the terms
are mandatory, and it would be a perversion of the thrust of the
statute to add "from the minor's own earnings". Section 199 of
the Civil Code continues:
The obligation of a father and mother to support their natural child
under this chapter including, but not limited to, sections 196 and 206,
shall extend only to, and may be satisfied only from the earnings and
separate property from each, if there has been a dissolution of their
marriage as specified by section 4350.11
To extrapolate from the above, the obligation for support
must come from community earnings of the father and mother
during marriage, not from the children's earnings. Additionally,
Civil Code Section 207 states that "[i]f a parent neglects to pro-
vide articles necessary for his child who is under his charge,
according to his circumstances, a third person may in good faith
supply such necessaries and recover the reasonable value there-
of from the parent. ' 34 Of cumulative and increasing signifi-
cance, again note the utter lack of reference to any responsibili-
ty of the child to support itself. Section 205 of the Civil Code
reiterates the ongoing primary responsibility of a parent for
support of the child even after the parent's death.
35
Finally, Civil Code Section 242 provides, "Every individual
shall support his or her spouse and child and shall support his
or her parent when in need. The duty imposed by this section
shall be subject to the provisions of sections 196, 206, 246, 4700,
4801, and 5131 and 5132. ''36 Despite repeated references by the
courts to the obligation of support being reciprocal with the
parental rights of section 197, section 242, strangely enough,
makes no reference to that single statute which is the bulwark
33. CAL. CIv. CODE § 199 (West Supp. 1977). The term "dissolution," as
employed in Civil Code § 4350, refers only to dissolution by virtue of death,
divorce, or annulment. Hence, a mere de.facto separation would not limit the
parental obligation to support their unemancipated minor children to the sepa-
rate property and earnings of each spouse under Civil Code § 199.
34. CAL. CIV. CODE § 207 (West 1954).
35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 205 (West Supp. 1977). Section 205 provides in part that:
If a parent chargeable with the support of a child dies, leaving it
chargeable to the county, or leaving it confined in a state institution to
be cared for in whole or in part at the expense of the State, and such
parent leaves an estate sufficient for its support, the supervisor of the
county or the director of the state department having jurisdiction over
the institution involved, as the case may be, may claim provision for its
support from the parents' estate by civil action ....
36. CAL. CIv. CODE § 242 (West Supp. 1977).
of the parents' claim to the earnings of their minor children.
These sections of the Civil Code are clearly indicative of the
legislative intention that the child's earnings should not be the
primary source of his or her support.
This objective is further supported by the provisions of Sec-
tion 1504 of the California Probate Code giving the court the
power to defray the costs of the support, maintenance, and
education to parents of a minor, whose income is such as to
provide for his support, maintenance and education in a man-
ner more expensive than his parents can reasonably afford, out
of the income of the minor's own property.37 Even here there is
reference to the need of a court order prior to a unilateral
appropriation by the parents of any of the children's earnings.
Under section 1504 the court must direct that an allowance be
made to the parent before the child's property can be appropri-
ated. 8
The necessity of direct court supervision of the disposition of
property belonging to a minor child is not unique to a parent's
petition to apply the child's property towards his education and
support. California Probate Code Section 1430 provides that
where a minor has property belonging to him which does not
exceed $2000.00 in value, the amount or property due the minor
may be paid or delivered to a parent of the minor entitled to the
custody of the minor to hold in trust for the minor until his
majority, upon written assurance verified by the oath of such
parent that the total estate of the minor, including the property
to be paid or delivered, does not exceed $2,500.00 in value.39
Section 1430.5 of the same California Code states that where
there is money belonging to the minor in excess of $2,000.00 but
not exceeding $20,000.00, or where the sole asset of the minor's
guardianship is money in excess of $2,000.00 but not exceeding
$20,000.00, a parent of the minor entitled to his custody, or the
person holding the money belonging to the minor, may file a
verified -petition in the superior court of the county where the
minor resides, or in the superior court of the county having
jurisdiction over the disposition of such money, requesting the
37. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1504 (West Supp. 1977).
38. Id. Section 1504 states in part:
... the expenses of the support, maintenance and education of such
minor may be defrayed out of the income of his or her own property, in
whole or in part, as judged reasonable, and as directed by the court
.... (emphasis added).
Civil Code § 201 provides a further limitation by specifying that only a "proper
court" may make such an allowance. CAL. CIv. CODE § 201 (West Supp. 1977).
39. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1430 (West Supp. 1977).
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court to take jurisdiction over the disposition of the property.40
Section 1430.5 further provides that in such case the court may
order a termination of any guardianship and that such money
or property be deposited or invested, subject to withdrawal only
upon order of the court, or the court may prescribe such other
conditions as it deems in its discretion to be in the best interests
of the minor.
Both of these sections of the Probate Code restrict the author-
ity of the parent over the child's property. If the parent receives
property under the authority of either section, he or she takes
custody of the property solely as trustee for the minor. The
parent acquires no rights in the child's property whatsoever.
The only control that the parents may exercise over the proper-
ty is that which the court has bestowed upon them.
Apart from such judicially granted authority, the legislature
has also codified the principle that "[t]he parent as such has no
control over the property of the child."'4 1 The fact that the child
acquires the property while supported by the parent, or even as
the beneficiary of property paid for by the parent, does not
entitle the parent to an interest in the property.42 The conclusion
is unavoidable that the parental obligation of basic support and
maintenance of the child under California statutory law is in
fact independent of any parental right to the child's earnings.
Modernly it would seem that the legislative intention ex-
pressed in the statutes has been given full force and effect by
the California judiciary.
Notwithstanding the broad latitude permitted the trial court in sup-
port matters, and acknowledging the existence of conflicting views,
we conclude that the soundest and most substantial statutory and
judicial authority supports the rule that parents bear the primary
obligation to support their child and that resort may be had to the
child's own resources for his basic needs only if the parents are finan-
cially unable to fulfill that obligation themselves .... While section
246 (authorizing the court to consider the child's need, relative wealth,
40. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1430.5 (West Supp. 1977).
41. CAL. CIV. CODE § 202 (West 1954).
42. See, e.g., Estate of Tetsubami Yano, 188 Cal. 645, 206 P. 995 (1922)
(although Japanese alien was not legally qualified to either hold or to convey
title to real property in 1922, his two year old daughter, born in the United States
and thus a native American citizen, could rightfully hold title to real property in
her name, even though the land was paid for, conveyed to her, and cultivated by
her father).
and income in determining the amount due for support) allows con-
sideration of the child's independent wealth and income, this section
does not authorize the court to relieve entirely a financially capable
parent of his or her obligation to support the child .... Although the
parent, if financially able, must provide the child's basic minimum
support needs, the child's income may be used to supplement the
parent's contribution in order to permit the child to live in a more
expensive manner by way of special education, travel, etc. It follows
as a corollary, however, that only if the parent is unable to provide
minimum level support should the child's outside income relieve the
parent entirely of his support obligation.4 3
In the case of Osterberg v. Osterberg,44 the court appeared to
adopt the principal that despite the technical wording of section
197, 4 5 the section can only be interpreted as a "right to" earn-
ings, akin to the distinction, hearkening back to law school days,
between "defeasible fees," "right to reenter" and "automatic
reversion." In that case the father had agreed to convey proper-
ty to the son in consideration of his aid and assistance in main-
taining the home and farm, and in helping to educate his
brothers and sisters. In discussing the father's defense to his
son's claim, the court said:
There is no merit in the contention that the deed was made without
consideration since the agreement to convey the title was made during
William's minority and that his father was entitled to his earnings,
under section 197 of the Civil Code, until he reached the age of his
majority. . . . The circumstances of this case indicate that the father
waived his legal right to his son's wages during his minority.4
However, the historical acceptance of the dependency of the
parental obligation of support upon the parental right to the
child's earnings lead early courts to conclude that the right
continued until relinquishment was effected by emancipation.
Emancipation was and is, basically, an economic doctrine
which can occur at any chronological age to terminate the par-
ent's duty of support, maintenance, and education, provided the
minor is self-sufficient. 47 Traditionally, emancipation has been
regarded as the prerogative of the parents. Children do not have
the unilateral privilege to emancipate themselves. Without the
express or implied consent of their parents, unmarried children
remain in their custody and control until reaching the age of
majority and the parents retain their rights to the children's
earnings .48
43. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 947-48, 544 P.2d 941, 944, 126
Cal. Rptr. 805, 808 (1976).
44. 68 Cal. App. 2d 254, 156 P.2d 46 (1945).
45. See note 8, supra, and accompanying text.
46. 68 Cal. App. 2d 254, 260, 156 P.2d 46, 49-50 (1945).
47. See generally 32 CAL. JUR. 3d Family Law § 201 (1977).
48. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 38 Cal. App. 388, 176 P. 382 (1918) (no emanci-
pation found by court where the only evidence of parents' relinquishment of
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In 1965, however, one court, reasoning in County of Alameda
v. Kaiser,49 rejected the entire concept of emancipation by
agreement and found the concept irrelevant to the parental
obligation of support. The court then went on to explain:
The term "emancipation" implies treatment of the individual as a
chattel. Slavish adherence to definition of the word, perhaps careless-
ly adopted in the first place, has lead some jurisdictions to infer that
the obligations of the parent to his child are based wholly upon his
right to the child's earnings, and that relinquishment of the right
requires release from the liability. This "rule" has been contradicted
or questioned by text writers .... 50
If the "rule" retained any vitality, it was destroyed in Bryant
v. Swoap51 where the court found that the parental duty to
support their needy children unable to provide for themselves
by work persists even if the child is emancipated or reaches the
age of majority.5 2
In no instance do the statutes or decisions provide that the
earnings of a child may be used for his support. They merely
refer to use of the child's property as a supplemental means of
improving the minor's lifestyle by use of funds under direct
court supervision.
The law is well settled that the primary duty to support a minor rests
upon his parents, and that the estate of the minor can only be resorted
to where the parents are unable to fulfill the obligation in whole or in
part. (Citations.) Parental liability for child support is not affected by
the fact that the child is possessed of property and has an estate of his
own. Parents are primarily liable for the support of their children, and
the children's estates may not be resorted to for that purpose so long
right to minor child's earnings was testimony of child himself) (see notes 12-13,
supra, and accompanying text; Slater v. California State Auto Ass'n, 200 Cal.
App. 2d 375, 19 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1962) (partial emancipation in form of relinquish-
ment to minor son of his earnings while in military service found where parents
at no time claimed any interest in those earnings or in the automobile purchased
by the son with those earnings).
49. 238 Cal. App. 2d 815, 48 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1965). In Kaiser, a mother was
held to be liable for the medical expenses of her son despite the fact that he was
twenty years old, was living apart from his mother, and had previously been
employed.
50. Id. at 817, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
51. 48 Cal. App. 3d 431, 121 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1975).
52. In Swoap, the "emancipated" daughter was fifteen when married and
was legally divorced within a period of one year thereafter, returning home to
live with her parents. The court based its ruling on Civil Code § 206 which states
in part: "It is the duty of the father, the mother... of any person in need who is
unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of
their ability .... CAL. CIV. CODE § 206 (West Supp. 1977).
as the parents are able to perform the duty of support and mainte-
nance.
53
Given such clearly affirmative statements of the law, it would
seem that a minor child should surely be legally entitled to
retain his or her own earnings. However, this has not been the
case. Instead, the courts have chosen to make an artificial dis-
tinction between wages and property. Both the parents' and the
child's "right to" the minor's earnings depends upon whether
the sum is classified as "wages" or as "property" (including
compensation for injuries), yet the distinction between "wages"
and "property" (and property income) is not always easily re-
cognized.
THE DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE
CHILD'S ACCUMULATIONS ARE "WAGES" OR "PROPERTY"
The California Legislature has provided no clear, definitive
statement distinguishing wages from property. Section 5118 of
the Civil Code, for example, incorporates both the "earnings"
and the "accumulations" of the child,54 further clouding the
issue of when an item is "property," to which the parent has no
right, or "accumulations," to which the parent is entitled. Even
the meaning of the word "earnings," used in the statute, has
been broadened to include more than wages.55 The problem of
deciding whether the property belongs to the child or his parent
becomes even greater when the property is acquired by means
other than employment or investment. Nowhere is this classifi-
cation problem better exemplified than in the field of tort law.
Parental immunity in tort was first recognized in the United
States in Mississippi.56 The doctrine was quickly adopted as the
general rule. At an early date, California also recognized the
right of the parent to recover from a third party for loss of an
injured child's earnings.57 Aside from the parents, the child had
53. In re Marriage of Cosgrove, 27 Cal. App. 3d 424, 432, 103 Cal. Rptr. 733,
738 (1972). See also, Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 544 P.2d 941, 126
Cal. Rptr. 805 (1976).
54. See note 9, supra, and accompanying text.
55. In re Marriage of Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 119 Cal. Rptr. 590
(1975). "The word 'earnings' is broader in scope than 'wages' and 'salary.' It can
encompass income derived from carrying on a business as a sole proprietor
where the earnings are the fruit or award for labor and services without the aid
of capital." Id. at 437, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
56. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
57. Fennerty v. Cummings, 132 Cal. App. 48, 22 P.2d 37 (1933). However,
where the parent has emancipated the child, or has, as guardian in the child's
action by pleading or testimony, waived his rights to the recovery or estopped
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a separate right to recover for his injuries,5 8 and a father suing
as a guardian ad litem for loss of the child's earning capacity
was estopped from suing on his own behalf.5 9 At this time, it was
possible to distinguish the causes of action against the third
party between the parents' right to recover for loss of their
child's earnings, the child's separate right to recover for his
injuries (or property loss), and the child's recovery of his earn-
ings through an action of his guardian ad litem (where a parent
waives his rights to the child's earnings).
However, in 1959 California recognized the right of children to
be free from willful misconduct on the part of a parent and
allowed a child to sue his stepparent for an intentional tort.60
More recently, in Gibson v. Gibson,8 the courts further expand-
ed the child's right to sue the parent in tort by permitting an
unemancipated minor to sue his father for negligence.
These cases illustrate the impossibility of the continued viabil-
ity of a scheme of classification between "property" of the child
and "earnings" of the child. If the child sues the parent in tort
and recovers for his injuries, must the court then allocate be-
tween compensation for injuries suffered by the child or to his
or her property and compensation for lost earnings and services
himself'from subsequently asserting such right, then the child is permitted to
recover these items. Id. at 50, 22 P.2d at 38.
58. Durkee v. Central Pac. R.R., 56 Cal. 388 (1880). The parents' cause of
action is for the loss of the child's services and earnings and for medical and
other expenses proximately caused by the injury. However, the cause of action
of the child is for those injuries caused which are personal to himself, such as
pain and suffering (both physical and mental), disfigurement, and so forth. Id.
at 392.
59. Girard v. Irvine, 97 Cal. App. 377, 275 P. 840 (1929).
60. Gillett v. Gillett, 168 Cal. App. 2d 102, 335 P.2d 736 (1959). In Gillett, an
eight year old child was allowed to recover $30,000 in damages from her step-
mother in a cause of action for assault and battery. The injury had necessitated
the removal of the plaintiff's spleen and a kidney. See generally, Note, Parental
Liability to a Minor Child for Injuries Caused by Excessive Punishment:
Gillett v. Gilett, 11 HASTINGS L.J. 335 (1960).
61. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971). Gibson overruled the
previously settled rule of Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (1931), that
an unemancipated minor has no cause of action against his parents, or one
standing in loco parentis toward him, for a tort based on simple negligence
The rationale of Gibson, as expressed by Justice Sullivan, was that "when there
is negligence, the rule is liability, immunity is the exception ... in the absence of
statute or compelling reasons of public policy." Id. at 922,479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal.
Rptr. at 293.
689.
of the child which the parents may demand? Such a result
would be absurd and was clearly not intended by the legislature.
The difficulties of classifying money due the minor as proper-
ty or earnings are further demonstrated by Pollock v. Industri-
al Accident Commission.62 In that case, a minor's employer had
made payment on -a Worker's Compensation claim directly to
the minor, justifying the payment under Section 212 of the Civil
Code 63 and Section 4650 of the Labor Code.64 In answering the
employer's contention, the court stated:
The expression "as wages" found in section 9(b) of the [Workmen's
Compensation] Act [Labor Code section 4650] does not mean that such
disability payments, or any award of the commission, shall constitute
wages, or that such payments shall constitute "wages" as that term is
used in section 212 of the Civil Code. Obviously an award for injury
under the act is not paid to the employee as wages, but as compensa-
tion for the injury.6 5
The court then when on hold that, under the provisions of the
Probate Code, the employer's indebtedness had not been dis-
charged.
The California Supreme Court in Pollock found it "obvious"
that compensation for injury was not paid as "wages" under
Section 212 of the Civil Code.66 Later the California Legislature
adopted, in language substantially similar to section 212, Sec-
tion 3605 of 'the Labor Code.67 Section 3605 provides that
compensation due a minor can be paid directly to him until his
parents or guardian give written notice of their claim to such
compensation to the insurance carrier or employer. However,
under Section 202 of the Civil Code, the parent as such has no
control over the child's property.6 8 Therefore, in adopting Sec-
tion 3605 of the Labor Code, the legislature must have intended
one of two alternatives: that compensation for injuries be re-
classified as "wages"; or that the claim of the parent or guard-
ian to the compensation be subject to the provisions of the
Probate Code, wherein the proceeds are delivered to the parent
or guardian in trust for the minor.
62. 5 Cal. 2d 205, 54 P.2d 695 (1936).
63. CAL. CIV,. CODE § 212 (West 1954). Section 212 authorizes an employer to
pay wages of the minor to such minor until the employer receives notice that the
minor's parent or guardian claims them.
64. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4650 (West 1971). Section 4650 provides that where
an injury causes temporary disability, a "disability payment which shall be
payable for one week in advance as wages" shall be paid to the employee.
65. 5 Cal. 2d 205, 209, 54 P.2d 695 at 697.
66. Id.
67. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3605 (West 1971).
68. See note 4, supra, and accompanying text.
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Under the provisions of the California Probate Code, debts
due a minor, other than wages, cannot be discharged by pay-
ment to the minor. Hence, for example, when a minor has a
disputed claim for damages against a third person, Section 1431
of the Probate Code allows either parent (or the parent having
the care, custody or control of the minor) to compromise or
execute a covenant not to sue on such claim.69 Before such a
compromise or covenant is valid, however, section 1431
specifies that it must be approved by the superior court of the
county in which the minor resides. The court in its discretion
may order that the funds be deposited or invested, and until
such deposit or investment is made, the compromise or
covenant is not effective.
Where the court approves a compromise or a covenant not
to sue on a minor's disputed claim for damages, Probate Code
Section 151070 provides that where the value of the property to
be paid under the court's approval does not exceed $10,000.00,
the court may, in addition to directing the appointment of a
guardian of the minor's estate or the deposit or investment of
such funds, allow all or any part of the money or the property be
paid or delivered to a parent of the minor without bond, if the
amount does not exceed $1,000.00 and the terms and conditions
of Section 1430 of the Probate Code7 1 are met. Even in this
instance, however, where the parent of the child receives the
proceeds, Section 1432 of the California Probate Code requires
the parent to account for any such funds received when the
child reaches the age of majority.72
Where the value of the property to be paid exceeds $10,000.00
and there is no guardian of the minor's estate, section 1510
requires that the court must either appoint a guardian and or-
der the property to be paid to him, or that it must direct that the
proceeds due the minor be invested or deposited, subject to
withdrawal only upon order of the court. Furthermore, section
1510 expressly gives the court the power to prescribe such
conditions as it may deem to be in the best interests of the minor
and to retain jurisdiction over any part of the money paid,
69. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1431 (West Supp. 1977).
70. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1510 (West Supp. 1977).
71. See note 39, supra, and accompanying text.
72. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1432 (West 1956).
delivered, deposited, or invested until the minor reaches the age
of eighteen years. Nowhere does this legislation express any
intention that the parents of the unemancipated minor should
have a right by virtue of either section 197 or section 5118 of the
Civil Code to appropriate even a portion of the minor's recovery
for their own use.
It would therefore seem entirely inconsistent with the judicial
interpretation of the meaning of compensation and the legisla-
tive intent, as expressed in the Probate Code, to assume that
Section 3605 of the Labor Code was intended to allow the
minor's recovery for injury to be unilaterally appropriated by
his parent or guardian. Rather, it seems more likely the statute
was adopted subject to the provisions of the Probate Code in an
effort to prevent possible double recovery by both the minor
and his parent or guardian in lieu of Pollock, and to insure that
the minor child actually receives the benefit Of such compensa-
tion.
Furthermore, in light of Section 202 of the California Civil
Code and the foregoing analysis, it would appear that expand-
ing the provisions of the Probate Code to protect children's
earnings (derived from any source) would surely be more rea-
sonable and equitable than predicating such protection upon a
continued reliance on a classification scheme of "wages" and
"property." Such a scheme while perhaps theoretically achiev-
able is, in practice, impossible to accomplish. To disallow pro-
tection simply because the child's earnings cannot be conclu-
sively shown to be "property" is entirely unfair and contrary to
the spirit and intention of the Probate Code.
CONCLUSION
The writers are convinced beyond a peradventure of doubt
that the glaring inequities inherent in Civil Code Sections 197
and 5118 demand immediate corrective action on the part of the
legislature or an affirmative declaration on the part of the
judiciary that the laws are intended to be subject to the provi-
sions of the California Probate Code protecting the child's inter-
est in his property. As was initially pointed out, one need only
venture into the burgeoning field of juvenile law to observe the
continuing recognition of minors' constitutional rights.7 3 In the
face of such a direction, can Sections 197 and 5118 of the Civil
Code be considered viable? The sections are reminiscent of
73. See notes 1 and 2, supra.
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servitude abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.74 In fact, their thrust bespeaks of more than in-
voluntary servitude, approaching the level of slavery. Were the
sections of the Civil Code to be blindly adhered to, would it not
raise the issues, in a dissolution, of which parent retains "cus-
tody" of the earnings of the minor and whether the parent who
loses custody of the child has been divested of his or her thereto-
fore (alleged) vested rights in the child's earnings without due
process of law?
The quagmire surrounding the distinction between "wages,"
"property" and "compensation for injuries" quickly engulfs the
courts when such a distinction is attempted. Further, the under-
lying rationale predicated on the obligation of support, entitling
the parent to his or her child's earnings no longer exists.75 In-
stead it has been replaced by a policy of extending unto minors
protection of their constitutional and financial rights. Clearly,
therefore, the time has arrived wherein the minor's right to
retain his own "wages" and "earnings," derived from any
source, whether as the fruit of his labor or as income from
property or compensation for injuries, should be recognized by
both the legislature and the courts. The protections against the
parents' unilateral appropriation of the child's property
contained in the California Probate Code and discussed herein
should be expanded to protect all of the child's property.76
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1, provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction."
75. This was the conclusion drawn by the courts in both County of Alameda
v. Kaiser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 815, 48 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1965), and Bryant v. Swoap, 48
Cal. App. 3d 431, 121 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1975), discussed in the text accompanying
notes 49-51, supra.
76. The authors believe that further reform may be necessary to accom-
plish this end, including the adoption of appropriate provisions in the California
Penal Code to insure that the requirements of the Probate Code are complied
with. It is not certain that the superior court's present powers of contempt will
be adequate for enforcement.

